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Summary
To achieve the commitments to both carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, China
should focus on those policies of significant impact on emissions reduction at the
lowest cost. Launching the national carbon market with the power generation sector is
a good start point in this direction. Since its operation, the carbon price has not
experienced sharp fluctuations, and falls within a range of CNY40~60 per ton.
The block agreement transaction dominates trading, but with an average discount
rate of 9.6% in block agreement, the aforementioned carbon prices overestimate
the overall carbon prices. While the overall compliance rate measured against entities
reached about 94.4%, there are significant differences across provinces, with
compliance rate ranging from 82.9% to a full 100% compliance. Entities engaging in
trading are mainly for compliance, and therefore transaction is driven by compliance.
This article argues that the development of the carbon market requires further reform
of the electricity pricing mechanism and the coordinated development of various
related markets. With respect to national carbon trading scheme itself, the article
discusses the areas where more work needs to be done to ensure that the national
carbon emissions trading scheme functions properly. This involves carbon emissions
trading legislation, further improvement in the rules conducive to the use of carbon
emissions trading as a market tool, and the expansion of the participating
industries and the scope of the carbon market in terms of diversifying market
players and increasing trading varieties. Given the co-existence of the national carbon
market and regional carbon market pilots, the article suggests the specific areas for the
regional carbon markets to take the initiative to strengthen the synergistic effects of
national carbon market. Furthermore, the article strongly recommends to continuously
increase the proportion of carbon allowances auctions, and to set up a transformation
fund from the proceeds of paid allocation of allowances to support the transformation
and upgrading of regions with low levels of development and technology in China.
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Abstract
To achieve the commitments to both carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, China
should focus on those policies of significant impact on emissions reduction at the
lowest cost. Launching the national carbon market with the power generation sector
is a good start point in this direction. Since its operation, the carbon price has not
experienced sharp fluctuations, and falls within a range of CNY40~60 per ton. The
block agreement transaction dominates trading, but with an average discount rate of
9.6% in block agreement, the aforementioned carbon prices overestimate the overall
carbon prices. While the overall compliance rate measured against entities reached
about 94.4%, there are significant differences across provinces, with compliance rate
ranging from 82.9% to a full 100% compliance. Entities engaging in trading are
mainly for compliance, and therefore transaction is driven by compliance. This article
argues that the development of the carbon market requires further reform of the
electricity pricing mechanism and the coordinated development of various related
markets. With respect to national carbon trading scheme itself, the article discusses
the areas where more work needs to be done to ensure that the national carbon
emissions trading scheme functions properly. This involves carbon emissions trading
legislation, further improvement in the rules conducive to the use of carbon emissions
trading as a market tool, and the expansion of the participating industries and the
scope of the carbon market in terms of diversifying market players and increasing
trading varieties. Given the co-existence of the national carbon market and regional
carbon market pilots, the article suggests the specific areas for the regional carbon
markets to take the initiative to strengthen the synergistic effects of national carbon
market. Furthermore, the article strongly recommends to continuously increase the
proportion of carbon allowances auctions, and to set up a transformation fund from
the proceeds of paid allocation of allowances to support the transformation and
upgrading of regions with low levels of development and technology in China.
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1. IntroductionFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1385 [2022]
China‟s stance toward international climate negotiations has been evolving concurrent
with changes in domestic and international contexts. While China has been very
active in participating international climate negotiations and undertaking domestic
climate mitigation and adaptation measures since the early days of climate talks, there
is a discrepancy between its domestic actions and its simultaneous reticence to act at
the international level. In line with changing domestic and international contexts,
China has been recalibrating its stance and strategy, and is widely seen as playing an
increasingly positive role in this complex process (Zhang, 2017).
Zhang (2000a and 2000b) envisioned that China could make a voluntary commitment
to total greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP at some point around 2020 and that
a combination of a targeted carbon intensity level with an emissions cap at the sector
level would be the most stringent commitment that it could make around 2020. It was
only just prior to the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009 that China pledged to cut
its carbon intensity by 40–45% by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels. While this is
consistent with China‟s longstanding opposition to hard emissions caps on the ground
that such limits will restrict its economic growth, this marked a point of departure
from its longstanding position on its own climate actions.
Zhang (2009, 2011a and 2011b) argued that there is a room for further increase in
China‟s climate commitments, and, based on the balanced analysis, suggested a 46-50%
cut in its carbon intensity by 2020 (This turned out to be what China had actually
achieved. China‟s carbon intensity was reduced by 48.4% by 2020) and that China
needs to take on absolute emissions caps around 2030. In the Paris climate summit,
for the first time China committed to absolute emissions target, aiming to cap its
carbon emissions around 2030 and try to peak early, and to increasing the share of
non-fossil fuel use to around 20% by 2030 (NDRC, 2015).
At the general debate of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly in
September 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China aims to have
carbon emissions peak before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. This
not only strengthens China‟s previous commitment to peaking around 2030, but also
adds the new commitment to carbon neutrality before 2060. Several studies have
suggested that China can do that, so the commitment to peaking before 2030 may not
be surprising. For example, GEIDO (2021) suggests that China‟s coal consumption
peaks by 2025 and carbon emissions peak around 2028. However, the new
commitment to carbon neutrality came as a complete surprise to both international
and Chinese experts, and is neither bowing to international pressure, nor is this pledge
conditioned on other countries‟ commitments.
The new pledge constrains China‟s carbon pathways after 2030. Without the
commitment to carbon neutrality, theoretically speaking, there could be a variety of
China‟s emissions pathways after carbon peaking around 2030. One pathway could be
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1385
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pathway could even aim to peak at a very high level to enable to leave more space for
future development and emissions. This commitment to carbon neutrality limits all
these possibilities because the aforementioned pathways will significantly increase the
difficulty in achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.
China has implemented a variety of programs and initiatives, and supporting
economic and industrial policies and measures targeted at energy saving and pollution
cutting over the past two decades. The country needs to further strengthen and expand
these programs and initiatives and supporting policies to keep China‟s energy demand
and pollution under control (Zhang, 2016).
However, these are necessary but not enough. To achieve both carbon peaking and
carbon neutrality requires huge capital investment in the field of renewable energy,
cross-regional power transmission, advanced energy storage, charging stations and
hydrogen refueling stations in the transportation field, end-use electrification, green
buildings, and energy saving and emission abating. A variety of studies project
different outcomes, but all the forecasts for required investment exceed CNY 100
trillion over the next 40 years (Tsinghua University, 2020; GEIDO, 2021; Yi, 2021).
Government finance can only cover a small portion of such a huge scale of investment,
and the significant gap must be made up by social capital, which must be guided by
market-oriented approaches. The carbon market can just play such a role in providing
market carbon price signals, incentivizing and attracting resources to tilt towards
low-carbon green projects, promote green and low-carbon development, and achieve
the aforementioned dual carbon goals while helping entities cut emissions at the least
cost.
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in late October 2011
approved seven pilot carbon trading schemes in Beijing, Chongqing, Guangdong,
Hubei, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Tianjin. By June 2014, all seven carbon trading
pilots started trading. These pilots together cover 2837 entities in 20 sectors. By June
2021, the all seven carbon trading pilots‟ total accumulated volume of traded
allowances reached 480 million tons of CO2, and total accumulated value of traded
allowances reached CNY 11.4 billion, with the average price of CNY 23.8 per ton of
allowance traded (SCIO, 2021). Generally speaking, these carbon trading pilots have
provided valuable references to improve their design, operation and compliance and
to develop national emissions trading scheme, and have achieved the expected
outcomes to some extent (Zhang, 2015a and 2015b, SCIO, 2021).
However, the volume of allowances traded in each pilot market is small, and there is
lack of liquidity. Also the carbon price is so low that seriously affects incentives for
investment in energy saving and emissions abating. Hoping that the carbon market
will play a role in carbon neutrality, it is of great practical significance and urgency to
promote the pilot to the national carbon emissions trading scheme (ETS).
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022
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China‟s national carbon market starts with power generation sector. This makes sense.
As the European Union (EU) greenhouse gas ETS and China‟s carbon trading pilots
show, emissions covered by an ETS generally account for a relatively large
proportion of total emissions. The power generation industry has a large amount of
carbon emissions, accounting for over 45% of the country‟s total carbon emissions.
And the power industry has relatively homogeneous products, data is easy to verify
and certify, and carbon quotas are easy to allocate. So national carbon market starting
with power generation sector is a good starting point and will help form a carbon
price signal across the whole society.
The national carbon emissions trading scheme covers 2162 power generation plants,
each emitting at least 26,000 tons of CO2 equivalent per year (MOEE, 2020a and
2020b). All together, all these covered power plants under the national carbon ETS
emit over 4.5 billion tons of CO2 emissions, accounting for over 45% of the national
total carbon emissions. Since it launched its first trading on 16 July 2021, the national
carbon market has operated more than one year, and all entities covered had
experienced one compliance cycle by the end of December 2021. It is a right time to
evaluate the operation of national carbon market and see how the market will go in
the near future.
Against this background, this article discusses how China‟s national carbon market
operates, what characteristics we can observe from its operation, how China‟s carbon
market compares with the EU carbon market, what challenges it faces, how carbon
market integrates with power market to achieve the desired outcomes, what the
construction of united national market means for carbon market, what the focuses of
the future development of national carbon market are, what the existing carbon pilots
can do to strengthen the synergistic effects of national carbon market, and how carbon
market serves as a means of helping achieve common prosperity. The better
understanding of all these crucial issues not only helps understand the development
and role of China‟s national carbon market in meeting the aforementioned dual carbon
goals, but also helps refine its design, operation and compliance for the stable and
healthy operation of the carbon market.

2. Evaluation of China’s national carbon market
Since it began trading on 16 July 2021, national carbon market has been operating
smoothly. By 15 July 2022, national carbon market had been running for one year of
242 trading days, total allowance traded reached 194 million tons of CO2 emissions,
and total accumulated value amounted to CNY8.49 billion, with average carbon price
equal to CNY43.8/ton. With China national ETS cap of 4.5 billion tonCO2 in 2021
and the EU ETS cap of 1.61 billion tonCO2 in 2021 and 819 million tonCO2 in 2030,
China‟s national carbon market covers the largest carbon emissions in the world, but
it is not the largest market in terms of total value of traded allowances in a
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1385
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sense, China is still far from the EU--the largest carbon market. The annual trading
value of China‟s national carbon market plus carbon trading pilots only amounted to
€1.29 billion in 2021, while the corresponding trading value of EU ETS reached as
much as € 683 billion in 2021, accounting for 90% of the world‟s total trading value
(Refinitiv, 2022).
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Figure 1 Volume and price of carbon allowances traded, 16 July 2021--30 September
2022
Source: Drawn based on the trading data from Shanghai Environment and Energy
Exchange.
Since its operation, on the whole, the carbon price has not experienced sharp
fluctuations, and the price fluctuates around the open price of CNY48/ton on the first
trading day and falls within a range of CNY40~60/ton (see Figure 1). However, the
aforementioned carbon price overestimates the overall carbon market price. In the
first year of operation, the total bulk agreement transaction volume amounted to 161
million tons, 83.9% of the total volume of allowances traded; the total bulk agreement
transaction valued at CNY 6.94 billion, 81.7% of the total amount of allowances
traded. There is a certain discount in bulk agreement transactions relative to listed
transactions, with an average discount rate of 9.6% (the average block agreement
transaction price of CNY 43.1/ton versus the average listed transaction price of CNY
47.7/ton), and the maximum discount rate is 30%. However, it should be pointed out
that bulk agreement transactions are mainly realized through quota allocation within
the corporation group, direct negotiation between different emissions controlling
enterprises or through intermediary negotiation. The resulting transaction is relatively
complex, the transaction process is not transparent enough, and the transaction price
settled is not a reflection of the value of the quota, nor does it reflect the marginal cost
of emissions reduction in the industry. Not only price signals are distorted, but also
this kind of transaction itself will increase transaction costs to a certain extent.
Given that an ETS is considered a means of helping entities meet the emissions
obligation at the lowest cost, compliance rate is a key indicator to evaluate the
performance of an ETS. Based on the first compliance cycle of national carbon ETS,
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022
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had been running for 114 trading days, and the overall compliance rate was 99.5%
measured against allowances.
The compliance rate measured against the number of entities is even crucial, because
it reflects the difficulties faced by small entities in meeting the compliance obligations,
and will be a decisive factor in determining whether the national carbon ETS achieves
the full compliance with emissions obligations and how quickly the national carbon
ETS expands. However, the central government did not release the compliance
information against the number of entities at all. We have done diligent work to seek
for this missing information of paramount importance.

Figure 2 Performance of 29 provinces in China‟s national carbon market in
2019-2020, ranging from 83% to a full 100% compliance
Sources: Drawn based on the author‟s own compiled data from the 29 provinces‟
departments of ecology and environment.
In the first half of 2022, the competent departments of ecology and environment in
various provinces or equivalent one after another announced their own performance
of the entities covered under the national carbon ETS and penalties in their provinces.
Beijing provided a list of 14 key emissions controlling entities covered, but there was
no specific performance of these entities made available. Also the data of Tibet was
not founded. In the end, we have compiled the compliance data from 29 provinces or
equivalent in China. Based on the information released from 29 provinces, we found
that there are 121 non-complying entities in the first compliance cycle, and that the
overall compliance rate measured against the number of entities was lower, but it still
reached 94.4%. Moreover, there are significant differences across provinces or
equivalent. As shown in Figure 2, in terms of the number of entities, while
Guangdong, Hubei, Shanghai, Tianjin, Gansu and Hainan had a 100% compliance
rate, the lowest compliance rate at the province level recorded at 82.9% in Ningxia,
whose compliance rate measured against allowances was as high as 98.3%. The
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1385
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being the third lowest (89.0%) against the number of entities and the lowest (95.9%)
against allowances respectively. For a country as a whole, 14 provinces or equivalent,
or 48.3% of all, had the compliance rate below the national average in the first
compliance cycle.
Coal-fired power plants that failed to comply with the emissions targets could partly
be related to the policy of high limit value of carbon content of coal combustion
element in power generation. The high limit policy requires coal-fired plants to carry
out the measurement of carbon content of coal burned in power plants to calculate
their carbon emissions, otherwise the default value would be used. But the default
value is punitive, 20%~ 30% higher than the measured value when the enterprise does
not measure the value. So power plants that have not carried out measurement of
elemental carbon content before or have been forced to use the high limit value to
calculate carbon emissions due to non-standard measurement, resulting in an
overestimation of their carbon emissions by 20%~30%. For a power plant of 600 MW
under the carbon price of CNY 50 per ton, this difference will increase the
compliance cost of CNY 20-30 million.1 The first case of data fraud disclosed by the
Ministry of Ecology and Environment is to avoid this policy by SinoCarbon
Innovation & Investment Co. for falsifying and forging the test report of Inner
Mongolia Ordos High tech Materials Co. and instructing several emissions controlling
enterprises for the production of false coal samples and other fraud problems (MOEE,
2022a).
As shown in Figure 1, entities engaging in trading are mainly for compliance, and
therefore, transaction is driven by compliance. From the perspective of trading
volume of allowances, except that the trading volume on the first day reached 4
million tons, the trading volume on subsequent trading days was basically less than
200000 tons, and the trading volume on some trading days was between 10 tons to
1000 tons. This trading pattern remains until mid November 2021, from which
onwards, trading increases significantly. More than 20 million tons were traded on 16
December 2021, and 136 million tons were traded in December 2021, 3.2 times that
of the combined total traded in the previous 5 months, which were 76% of the total
traded in the first compliance cycle and 70% of the total traded in the first year of
operation. With the completion of allowance surrendering, transaction has then
dropped significantly. From then onwards to the end of September 2022, the trading
1

In 2021, the carbon dioxide emissions per unit thermal power generation in China
were about 828 g/kWh (China Electricity Council, 2022). For a plant of the capacity
of 600 MW operating 4000 hours a year, it emits 199 million tons of CO2 emissions a
year. The carbon price on China‟s national carbon market fell within a range of
CNY40~60 per ton in the first year of operation. Assuming that the carbon price is
CNY 50 per ton, this means the total compliance cost of about CNY 10 billion if there
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Electronic Press
Services,
9
is noPublished
abatement
at all, 20%~30%
of which
is 2022
CNY 20-30 million.
7

volume on most Fondazione
of trading Eni
days
wasMattei
basically
lessPapers,
than 200
tons,[2022]
and the trading
Enrico
Working
Art. 1385
volume on quite number of trading days was between 10 tons to 100 tons. This led to
a lack of liquidity. The transaction volume in the first compliance cycle accounts for 2%
of the total quota of power generation plants, while the traded volume of allowances
in the EU ETS reached 758% of the total annual quota in 2021.
This could be lack of understanding of the carbon emissions trading scheme and
awareness of carbon asset management not strong yet. Of 2162 power generation
plants covered in the national carbon trading scheme, only 186 power generation
plants in the seven carbon pilots are included in the national carbon trading scheme,
implying that more than 90% of the power plants have not participated in the pilot
trading. The results are not different from the carbon pilots. According to the carbon
pilots, trading peak appears as compliance approaches the end. One month before the
end of the first compliance cycles, transaction volume of Shanghai and Beijing
accounted for 73% and 75% of the total transaction volume during the first
compliance cycles, respectively. Carbon prices soared at the end of compliance. In the
last week of the performance order correction period, Beijing market prices rose day
by day, with a weekly increase of 24.5% (Zhang, 2015b).

3. Coordinated development of electricity market, green electricity and carbon
markets
The development of the carbon market requires further reform of the electricity
pricing mechanism. This also involves in the coordinated development of various
related markets, such as power market, green electricity market and carbon-related
markets.
Currently, China‟s national carbon trading scheme only includes the power generation
sector. Carbon trading mainly guides the structural adjustment within the power
industry through rising coal-fired power costs. But if the carbon price rises too fast
and too high, coal-fired power plants cannot afford it, because electricity tariffs have
remained regulated by the central government, so power generating plants have to
bear all incremental costs of carbon abatement alone and do not allow to pass through
the carbon costs incurred (Zhang, 2014 and 2015b). So coal-fired power plants have
no desire for high carbon price because they cannot afford it alone. This leads to the
situation in which carbon prices don‟t reach to reasonable levels for the emissions
abatement purpose, and consequently they cannot play a role in prodding economic
restructuring and upgrading of downstream industries on the power consuming side.
Thus, implementing emissions trading in the power sector creates a new impetus for
power pricing reform to allow the pass-through of carbon costs in the electricity
sector. From the national perspective, we should therefore make full use of the
opportunity of the construction of the national carbon market to promote the reform of
the electricity pricing mechanism, let electricity prices to reflect market supply and
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1385
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development of the carbon market and electricity market.
However, the reality in China suggests that a comprehensive power pricing reform
may take time. Until this long-awaited reform is undertaken, we have to look for other
options to reflect the carbon costs in power generation. Just like coal-fired power
plants that are mandated to install desulfurization and denitrification facility receive
power price premium for desulfurization and denitrification (Zhang, 2014), the
National Development and Reform Commission, the solo organization in China that is
mandated to set and change power prices, could offer power price premium for carbon
abatement. If the central government decides to take this option, that price premium
for carbon abatement would be offered nationwide to all fossil fuel-fired power plants
for their carbon abatement, not only those included in the carbon trading schemes
(Zhang, 2015b).
Green electricity and the Chinese Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) are
effective means of reducing emissions and compliance costs. Initially, the EU carbon
border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) provision does not cover indirect emissions
from electricity generation, but this part of emissions have been included in the bill
passed by the European Parliament on 22 June 2022 (European Parliament, 2022).
The inclusion of indirect emissions from electricity in the CBAM increases demand
for green electricity. In particular for those entities exporting goods to the EU market,
using green electricity in the production will reduce indirect carbon emissions
embodied in products and will thus lower potential carbon tariffs to be paid to the EU
under the EU CBAM provision.
However, green electricity and CCER in China overlap in related emissions
reductions. China allows the covered entities in the national ETS to meet up to 5% of
their emissions caps. The EU certainly eyes on those overlapped emissions reductions
that the entities use for their domestic compliance purposes, and at the same time are
used for reductions in carbon tariffs for the use of green electricity. Thus, the
overlapped emissions reductions need to be excluded to avoid double-counting
reductions and overestimating emissions reductions. From a positive perspective,
given that green electricity trading is an important way for enterprises to achieve
green and low-carbon development in China, the transmission of CBAM costs may
become an important positive factor in promoting the development and consumption
of domestic green electricity. Moreover, in the carbon emissions reduction accounting
guidelines of some industries, green power is not deducted from the amount of power
purchased by enterprises. If the enterprises purchase green electricity, it is equivalent
to paying extra costs. Therefore, there is necessity to open up the price mechanism of
green power and carbon emissions reduction and integrate them into a unified cost
system.
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022
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4. The focuses of the construction of the national carbon market in the future
More work needs to be done to ensure that the national ETS functions properly. This
will involve four key areas: carbon emissions trading legislation; further improvement
in the rules conducive to the use of carbon emissions trading as a market tool; which
sectors should be given priority for inclusion, and diversifying market players and
increasing trading varieties.
4.1 Carbon emissions trading legislation
Ideally, a national ETS legislation needs to be established to authorize emissions
trading at the national level to ensure that a nationwide carbon emissions trading
scheme functions properly in China (Zhang, 2015b). Even if the Interim Measures on
the Management of Carbon Emissions Trading (Revised draft) released by the
Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MOEE, 2021) are finally issued as a formal
regulation, it is only a MOEE‟s regulation, and the binding force is low.
However, as the carbon market expands beyond the institutional jurisdiction of
administrative regions, disputes could become more intensive and frequent. The only
MOEE provisions are not enough. In fact, if the national carbon market is to achieve
real circulation, it is very important to ensure that all the emissions data are properly
measured, reported and verified with the aim to make each unit of emissions reduction
reliable and comparable among sectors and across regions. This requires a national
legislation. The national legislation should provide united guidelines and
methodologies on design and operation of ETS and enforcement of measurement,
reporting and verification (MRV) and penalties for non-compliance, ascribes
allowances as financial assets and defines their valid duration with the aim to generate
economically valuable and environmentally credible reductions and to provide a solid
basis for building a sound national ETS. If it is not possible in the short term, at least
the proposed carbon emissions trading management regulations need to be elevated to
more binding State Council regulations (Zhang, 2015b).
4.2 Further improvement in the rules governing carbon emissions trading
The practice of carbon emissions trading in the OECD countries shows that a strong
punishment mechanism is crucial to the orderly operation of the carbon emissions
trading market. In the Interim Measures on the Management of Carbon Emissions
Trading (Draft for comments) released by the MOEE in April 2019, for entities not in
compliance with emissions obligations, in addition to deducting the same amount of
shortfall allowances from the amount to be allocated to non-complying entities in the
following year‟s allocation, non-complying entities will be charged at 3-5 times the
prevailing yearly average market prices for each shortfall allowance (MOEE, 2019).
However, in the Interim Measures on the Management of Carbon Emissions Trading
(Revised draft) released by the MOEE in March 2021, the penalties for
non-compliance have been significantly weakened, and are even weaker than the
relevant penalties in the current carbon trading pilots. For the entities that violated the
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1385
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shortfall allowances when allocating carbon emission allowances for the next year,
but the penalty amount has been adjusted to only a fine of more than CNY 100,000 to
less than CNY 500,000 (MOEE, 2021). The weakened measures are not conducive to
the orderly operation of the national carbon trading market. Therefore, it is of great
practical significance and urgency to further improve the rules conducive to the use of
carbon emissions trading as a market tool to achieve the dual carbon goal.
The policy of high limit value of carbon content of coal combustion element in power
generation is the controversial area. The policy initially aims to encourage coal-fired
plants to measure carbon content of coal burned to calculate their carbon emissions
and thus take emissions reduction measures. The high limit value of 0.03356 tC/GJ
must otherwise be adopted for enterprises that have not measured the carbon content.
But the default value sets to be so punitive so as to induce and amplify the
falsification of carbon emissions data to a certain extent. In June 2022, the Ministry of
Ecology and Environment issued a notice to adjust the default value of carbon content
per unit calorific value of coal from 0.03356 tC/GJ to 0.03085 tC/GJ, down by 8.1%,
regardless of coal type (MOEE, 2022b). This downward adjustment makes the carbon
dioxide accounting data closer to the real situation and reduces the pressure on power
plants to comply with the emissions obligations. This is a good step forward, but
given that the accounting based method is still the main method to determine the
carbon emissions in the national carbon market for a period of time in the future, it is
suggested that the competent department should learn from the previous reasonable
classification of grid emissions factors and the management method of continuous
updating, gradually establish a more scientific classification and more reasonable
measurement of the carbon content database of coal-fired power plants, and continue
to improve and update it to ensure that the carbon emissions accounting results are
more accurate and responsibilities are clearer.
4.3 Which sectors should be given priority for inclusion?
Expanding industry participation in carbon markets and the scope of the carbon
market can help increase market liquidity and stabilize carbon prices. If the MRV of
carbon emissions are guaranteed, the more industries covered, the greater the
heterogeneity of enterprises, the greater the gap between enterprises‟ emissions
reduction costs, and the more carbon trading between them, which is conducive to
reducing the total compliance cost under any given overall emissions reduction target.
The question then is which industries will be given priority to be included in the
national carbon market in the second batch?
In addition to power generation, China aims to cover petrochemical, chemicals,
building materials, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, papermaking, and aviation in
the next five years or so. How quickly it can materialize depends at least on the
accuracy of emissions data and the size of emissions. The more accurate data, the
more easy and quick a sector is covered. The more emissions a sector emits, the more
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sector is included. This is why power generation industry is considered first in the
national carbon market: the power industry has relatively homogeneous products, data
is easy to verify and certify, and carbon quotas are easy to allocate, while it accounts
for a large portion of the national carbon emissions.
Indeed, the expansion of the national carbon market is postponed because of the
problems of carbon data accounting. The carbon emissions allowances issued to each
entity to be covered in any carbon trading scheme are closely related to both the
quantity of products and production methods. It means that if an entity producing the
same product has multiple technological processes, there will be multiple baselines.
This increases the difficulty of accurately calculating the amount of allowances issued.
Therefore, the competent authorities need to spend a lot of time every year to find out
the baseline levels of various industries. By contrast, the EU ETS is based on
cap-and-trade. Therefore, regardless of other conditions, there is only one baseline for
the same product, which is conducive to the industry‟s transition from high carbon
emissions to low carbon emissions. This suggests that China‟s national carbon market
should consider changing from carbon emissions intensity control to total emissions
control as soon as possible in order to be in line with the dual carbon goals.
Carbon emissions of cement in building materials industry and electrolytic aluminum
in non-ferrous industry are relatively easy to account for in the other seven major
industries. The new version of the emissions data accounting standard has been
formulated. So from the perspective of accuracy of carbon data accounting, cement
and electrolytic aluminum industry should be given priority for inclusion.
From the perspective of the size of emissions, first and foremost, priority should be
given to industries with large carbon emissions, data that are easy to verify, and
carbon allowances that are easy to allocate. Iron and steel and cement industries are
not only important basic industries in the national economy, but they are also major
carbon emitters. Carbon emissions of the iron and steel and cement industries account
for about 13-15% and 10-12% of China‟s total carbon emissions, respectively.
Accounting for about 25% of China‟s carbon emissions, therefore, these two
industries are the two key industries to meet China‟s dual carbon targets. Iron and
steel, and cement industry should be given priority for inclusion. Combined with the
power generation industry accounting for 45% of the national total emissions, the
total carbon emissions of these three industries account for about than 70% of the
country‟s total carbon emissions.
Some external factors or pressure also play a role in such a consideration for
prioritization. For example, those sectors that are subject to the EU CBAM are given
priority to be included to lower the burden of carbon tariffs. From the perspective of
the external environment, iron and steel, and cement industry covered by the EU
CBAM should be given priority to be included in the national carbon market to reduce
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1385
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If iron and steel, cement industry, and electrolytic aluminum are included, then about
70% of national total carbon emissions are covered under China‟s national trading
scheme. This coverage will far exceed the EU‟s carbon trading system coverage,
which covers about 45% of the EU‟s total carbon emissions. Further coverage
expands to industries such as petrochemical, chemicals, other building materials,
non-ferrous metals, papermaking, and aviation in the next five years or so.
4.4 Diversifying market players and increasing trading varieties
The NDRC in March 2016 submitted the Measures on the Management of Carbon
Emissions Trading (Draft for review) to the State Council (NDRC, 2016). A section
summarizing comments from other agencies shows that the NDRC refused a call by
China Securities Regulatory Commission to remove references to futures trading. The
NDRC views the inclusion of futures trading is the common practice in all other
carbon emissions trading schemes, and helps improve the market liquidity. However,
in accordance with the deployment requirements of the central government and the
State Council, the NDRC later emphasizes that the carbon market as a policy tool
orients towards for controlling greenhouse gas emissions and that the operation of the
carbon trading system avoids excessive speculation and excessive financial
derivatives, there is no reference to trading varieties, either in regulations or in
practice.
While this is initially considered necessary for ensuring the smooth and standardized
operation of national carbon trading, it is necessary to gradually increase the types of
transactions and accelerate the innovation of products and services though, as national
carbon trading runs smoothly. The national carbon market needs to 1) explore and
develop products or services, such as carbon sink trading, carbon quota pledge loans,
carbon asset pledge financing, carbon funds, carbon trusts, international carbon
factoring financing, carbon trading financial consulting; 2) gradually introduce carbon
financial derivatives, such as carbon forward, carbon futures; and 3) to diversify
market players to allow individual and institutional investors and financial institutions
to enter into the market for trading. All these help improve market liquidity.
However, it should be emphasized that the financial products and services of these
carbon markets should serve to reduce the cost of carbon abatement as the starting
point. In essence, carbon emissions trading is a market-based means to encourage
emissions reduction at a lower cost. It helps emissions controlling entities achieve
emissions reduction at a lower cost, reduce the cost of compliance, and improve the
overall compliance rate. This is the essential attribute of the carbon market resulting
from carbon emissions trading. The development of carbon market financial products
and services must deal with the relationship between the essential attributes of the
carbon market.
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022
13

15

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1385 [2022]

5. What should the existing carbon pilots do next?
The national carbon market cannot be achieved overnight. Zhang (2015b) points out
that until a nationwide carbon market will become fully functional, the regional ETSs
will continue to function in parallel with a national carbon market and those entities
covered in the existing regional ETSs will be unconditionally integrated into a
nationwide ETS if they meet the latter‟s threshold. The current national carbon market
is indeed a dual-track operation of the regional carbon market and the national
emissions trading system. In the context of the construction of the national carbon
market, it is necessary to seriously consider how local or existing carbon pilots should
do and play their role in the next step in strengthening the effects of national carbon
market.
The notice of opinion on the Interim Measures on the Management of Carbon
Emissions Trading (Revised draft) released by the MOEE in March 2021 stipulates
that, after the implementation of the regulations, the regional carbon emissions trading
market will no longer be established. After the establishment of the national carbon
market, the industries involved in the regional carbon market, if aligned with the
coverage of the national carbon market, must be included in the national carbon
market. The local carbon market will no longer issue carbon allowances to key
emissions entities included in the national carbon market, and these key emissions
entities will no longer participate in the regional carbon market. Industries that have
been included in the regional carbon market but have not covered by the national
carbon market, and emission entities that do not meet the emissions thresholds in the
industries covered by the national carbon market, remain in the regional carbon
market, and the regional carbon market will continue to be responsible for the
allocation and clearing of their carbon allowances.
According to the current design of the national carbon market, the aforementioned
eight major high energy consuming and high emitting industries will all be included
in the national carbon market in the near future, and the national carbon market will
have a higher priority. This will inevitably reduce the size of the carbon market in
carbon trading pilots. The number of key emissions entities covered by the local
carbon market may increase more, but the carbon emissions of a single entity will be
greatly reduced, thus resulting in a substantial decrease in the overall quota size of the
local carbon market. This will have an impact on the liquidity of the local carbon
market. The central government should clarify the timing for the inclusion of other
high energy consuming and high emitting industries in the national carbon market as
soon as possible, so that the local carbon market can shift to include other industries
that are critical to the local realization of the dual carbon targets according to the pace
of incorporating these industries into the national carbon market, thus helping achieve
the local double carbon goals.
Although the national carbon market officially launched online trading in July 2021, it
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requires regional pilot carbon markets to continue to provide pilot experiences for the
national carbon market. In fact, the national carbon market is in the stage of
co-existence of the nationwide carbon market and regional carbon market pilots. This
provides room for the regional carbon markets to take the initiative, seek for areas of
innovation, and continue to make the full use of the local pilot carbon markets to
promote local energy conservation, emissions reduction and economic transformation
and upgrading. However, since they co-exist, it is necessary to clarify their respective
goals. Here are the few areas where the local carbon markets can form a synergistic
effect with the national carbon market.
First, the regional carbon market can continue to explore and improve more
mechanism designs. The carbon market is a policy market, and the way the
government issues allowances and the degree of looseness have a great impact on
carbon prices. For example, the national carbon market has not yet carried out paid
allocation of carbon allowances, and there are only a few carbon trading pilots to
auction allowances except for the Guangdong carbon market (Zhang, 2015a). For
reference, the EU ETS keeps increasing the portion of auctioning in allowance
allocation, rising from 5% in phase 1 (2005-2007), 10% in phase 2 (2008-2012) to 57%
of the total amount of allowances in phase 3 (2013-2020), and the share of allowances
to be auctioned remains the same in phase 4 (2021-2030) (European Commission,
2021).
Experience shows that paid distribution of allowances can help to form a higher
carbon price, reduce the total amount and intensity of emissions more effectively, and
can also effectively deal with external policy changes, such as the possible impact of
the EU CBAM on China‟s exports. From the national carbon market transactions in
2021, it is found that the market‟s trading activity is not active, which is not only
related to the operation mechanism of the carbon market, but is also affected by the
overall oversupply of allowances obtained by power generation plants but the
reluctance of emissions controlling plants to sell. Li et al. (2022) found that the
average surplus, that is, the proportion of the surplus quota to the total quota, is about
9%. Of the five largest national power generating groups in China whose total
installed power capacity accounts for nearly half of China‟s total installed power
generation capacity, Huadian Group has the highest quota surplus, accounting for 16.2%
of the total quota, followed by China Energy, Huaneng Group, Datang Group, State
Power Investment Group with the quota surplus of 10.5%, 10.4%, 9.5% and 8.2% of
its total quota, respectively. Power plants cannot judge how tight the future quota
allocation scheme would be. Selling quota might leave impression that their quotas
are indeed in surplus and are therefore allocated tight quotas in the future (so-called
the whip a quick ox phenomenon). As would be expected, they are generally reluctant
to sell allowances, thus resulting in very few transactions not for the purpose of
compliance. As major power generating groups are reluctant to sell allowances, small
power plants across China will find hard to purchase allowances in shortage for
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compliance rate measured against the number of entities is lower, in some provinces
substantially lower, than that against allowances. The reluctance of some companies
to sell can be alleviated by allocating carbon allowances through auction.
Therefore, the regional carbon market should carry out more exploration and practice
of the paid allocation of allowances, so as to provide reference for the paid allocation
of the national carbon market. Even if carbon allowances are allocated free of charge,
the principle of moderate and tight control of total emissions in the allocation of
allowances in the local carbon market also provides a reference for tightening the
baseline for the allocation of allowances in the national carbon market. For example,
in 2019, among the 111 enterprises in Hubei province that adopted the carbon
emissions intensity reduction method, 73% of the enterprises cut their emissions
intensity; among the 228 enterprises allocated allowances by the historical method, 60%
of the enterprises lowered their emissions (Cao, 2021). Hubei‟s experience shows that
the free emissions allowances obtained by enterprises decrease year by year, and the
proportion of enterprises with quota gaps gradually increases, which can effectively
force enterprises to reduce their emissions. The quota allocation plan for the second
implementation period of the national carbon market has not been announced so far,
but like the first compliance period, it is still a two-year compliance period. To what
extent the baseline for allowance allocation in the second compliance period can be
tightened affects whether the overall oversupply of allowances in the first compliance
period can be effectively resolved. The experience of the local carbon market in this
regard can provide references.
Second, the regional carbon market can include more industries and emissions entities.
The economic development stage and industrial structure of each region are different.
Based on the actual local circumstances, industries that plan to be included in the
national carbon market but have no clear timetable can be initially included in the
regional pilot carbon markets. For example, the Hubei pilot carbon market currently
includes 16 industries, of which the 8 industries are planned to be included in the
aforementioned national carbon market. At least in the short term, those emissions
entities, which are unlikely to be included in the national carbon market, are included
in the regional pilot carbon market. For example, as Beijing has service-dominated
economic structure, universities, hospitals and other institutions are all Beijing key
carbon emitting entities covered by its carbon pilot market. These first tries
accumulate experience, and provide useful exploration for the national carbon market.
The third is to explore the regional carbon market earlier than the country to take the
lead in the transition to a mass-based carbon market. Both the regional carbon market
and the national carbon market are currently rate-based carbon markets. The central
government encourages regions capable of taking the lead in reaching the carbon peak.
The pilot carbon trading regions such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenzhen have
clearly proposed to reach the carbon peak in 2025 ahead of the national carbon
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from a rate-based emissions trading structure to a mass-based trading system. Goulder
and Morgenstern (2018) show that converting from the rate-based structure to a
mass-based system could offer important benefits in terms of both cost-effectiveness
and economic efficiency. These regions can thus implement a mass-based system
earlier than the country as a whole, exploring the close integration of the local
emissions reduction path with the local carbon markets. Combined total emissions
control, coverage of sectors and entities and allowance allocations with local annual
emissions reduction targets, this undoubtedly provides a very useful reference for the
national carbon market.
The fourth is to explore the construction of a regional carbon market across the
institutional jurisdiction of administrative regions through the carbon market in the
Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. The current local carbon market is
limited to the existing provincial and municipal administrative divisions, and there is
no regional carbon market that spans across the institutional jurisdiction of provinces
and cities. The central government is now vigorously promoting the strategy of the
Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, so how to promote its construction
in an all-round and multi-angle? On the one hand, Guangdong is a large emitting
province, and Guangdong and Shenzhen have the market foundation for carrying out
carbon trading pilots for more than 8 years. On the other hand, it is difficult for Hong
Kong and Macao to form an independent carbon market. Therefore, the establishment
of a unified carbon market in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area
can indeed act as a carrier to promote in-depth cooperation in the Guangdong-Hong
Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. If a unified carbon market in the Guangdong-Hong
Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area can be formed, it is possible to integrate the
financial/carbon emissions trading institutions of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao,
Shenzhen and the futures exchanges and carbon emissions exchanges in Guangzhou,
so as to truly achieve a strong alliance and expand the carbon market.
The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area carbon market can play a role
at least in the following aspects. In addition to the aforementioned regional carbon
market including more industries and emissions entities before the national carbon
market, some rules can be innovated before the national carbon market, including
international benchmarking standards. Generally speaking, the construction of the
national carbon market is relatively cautious, and the liquidity and volatility of the
national carbon market will be strictly limited. In view of this, the carbon market in
the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area can aim at liquidity, focus on
carbon finance, and pilot some financial instruments and trading products before the
national carbon market, so as to diversify trading products and services. Making full
use of the international reputation of Hong Kong and Macao, the Guangdong-Hong
Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area carbon market can carry out international carbon
emissions trading first, play the role of a window for interconnection with the
international carbon market, and lay the foundation for the future development of
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the basis of the existing Guangzhou, Shenzhen Carbon Emissions Exchange and
Guangzhou Futures Exchange, we can establish a unified carbon market in the
Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, which is invested, operated and
managed by the three parties of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao, taking into
account more enterprises and financial institutions, enabling Hong Kong and Macao
to play a better role, and truly promoting it as a part of the national strategy to
strengthen in-depth cooperation in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay
Area.
The fifth is to explore the linkage between the national carbon market and the regional
carbon market, and conduct carbon allowances trading between the national carbon
market and the regional carbon market. Even if there is a national carbon market,
China‟s carbon market is still a regionally segmented market. There is no linkage
between regional carbon markets, and the national carbon market is also disconnected
from all regional carbon markets. Therefore, China‟s carbon market is still not a
unified market. Since the launch of the national carbon market, the price has
stabilized at CNY 40~60 per ton, which is about twice the average carbon price of the
regional carbon market. With the strengthening of emissions reductions targets over
time, the national carbon market price is widely expected to continue to rise over time
(Slater et al., 2022)2. This will have a certain psychological impact on the regional
carbon market price level related to carbon price signals. In 2022, most of the carbon
prices in the carbon pilots will be rising. In February 2022, the carbon price in the
Guangdong pilot once reached a record high of CNY 95 per ton, which is much
higher than that of the national carbon market. In the long run, the carbon price in
most carbon trading pilots will increase with the increase in the national carbon price,
but the average price in the local carbon markets will still be far lower than the
national carbon market price.
Considering that the carbon emissions covered by the national carbon market is much
higher than that of the regional carbon markets, from the perspective of reducing the
compliance cost of key entities covered in the national carbon market, the central
government should consider allowing key emissions entities in the national carbon
market to purchase carbon allowances from the regional carbon markets. It helps to
reduce their total compliance cost. The linkage between the national carbon market
and the regional carbon markets can start with trading in regional carbon markets that
have done a good job in MRVing carbon emissions data, and gradually expand to
other regional carbon markets that meet emissions data requirements. As the national
carbon market incorporates more industries and emissions entities and conducts
2

Based on the survey that collected 417 responses from stakeholders in different
industries, the average carbon price in the national carbon market in 2022 is expected
to be CNY 49/ton, rising to CNY 87/ton by 2025 and CNY 139/ton by 2030 (Slater et
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may focus on specific participants, such as emissions entities from industries not
included in the national carbon market, small and medium-sized enterprises,
emissions companies (units) and individuals. It is also possible to use the regional
carbon market to develop more carbon financial products and services, such as
voluntary emissions reduction trading, carbon inclusive finance, carbon funds, carbon
mortgage loans, carbon futures, carbon options, etc. All these will help accumulate
experience in the stable implementation of the national carbon market. According to
the above development, the Chinese carbon market will be formed with the national
carbon market as the mainstay and the distinctive regional carbon market as the
supplement.

6. Carbon allowances and proceeds of paid allocation tilted towards less
developed regions to help achieve common prosperity
In 2012, the report of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) made that “we must adhere to the road of common prosperity” one of the eight
basic requirements for the new victory of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and
emphasized that “common prosperity is the fundamental principle of socialism with
Chinese characteristics”. The 10th meeting of the Central Finance and Economic
Commission in August 2021 made the latest statement of the CPC‟s Central
Committee on common prosperity, which gradually realized the common prosperity
of all people and was placed in a more important position.
There is a consensus that common prosperity is not to lie flat, but to persist in
development, and it is high-quality development, which continuously improves the
prosperity of the whole society. Carbon emissions trading that China is now
vigorously advocating and promoting, the so-called carbon market, is a market-based
means that helps achieve energy conservation goals, environmental constraints goals
and dual carbon goals, and at the same time has the least impact on economic
development. Well designed, carbon market can serve as a means of helping achieve
common prosperity.
6.1 Carbon allowances tilted towards less developed regions to help achieve
common prosperity
The carbon market is a policy market. While the general public calls the domestic
financial market and the stock market policy markets, they are different from each
other. To say that the financial market and the stock market are policy markets, it is
more because these markets are too disturbed by policies. However, the carbon
market is completely a policy market. Given the carbon emissions target, under the
carbon emission trading system, the emissions reduction is given a market value, and
its market value is closely related to the overall strictness of carbon emissions
constraints and the allocation method of allowances. When determining the
environmental goals and the total amount of carbon quotas, the central government
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income gaps, and allow more relaxed environmental constraints for regions with
relatively low levels of economic development. More total carbon emissions quotas
and greater development/carbon space is given. Just like in the international climate
change negotiations, each country has different stages of development and different
levels of development and technology, and commitments of each country are
determined under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Developed countries have to take more responsibility for emissions reduction, while
developing countries have to assume the level of climate-related responsibility
comparable with the level of their development. At the same time, developed
countries should provide financial and technical assistance to developing countries.
Since the implementation of energy-saving targets in terms of energy use per unit of
output in the “Eleventh Five-Year Plan” period (2006-10), the central government has
set different energy-saving targets after taking into account the differences in
development, technology, and energy structure across regions when establishing
energy-saving targets for provinces and municipalities. For example, the national
energy-saving target of the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” period (2011-15) is 16%, and
the energy-saving target of each province and municipality ranges from 10% to 18%,
with a difference of 8%. The national energy-saving target of the “13th Five-Year
Plan” period (2016-20) is 15%, and the energy-saving targets of each province and
municipality are set at 10% to 17%, with a 7% difference. In the determination of
carbon constraints and total carbon allowances, not only the differences between
regions should be further considered, but also the total carbon emissions constraints
may have a greater impact of a wider scope, so the weight of this consideration should
be even higher. The differences may be larger than the differences between the
previous energy intensity constraints across regions.
6.2 Proceeds of paid allocation of allowances tilted towards less developed
regions to help achieve common prosperity
Allowances can be distributed either free of charge or through auctions. Except for
Guangdong, the carbon pilot market is basically distributed free of charge, and there
are a small number of auctions in Shanghai and Shenzhen for companies that have
difficulty in compliance (Zhang, 2015b). The national carbon market now only
includes the power industry, and all allowances are issued free of charge, and no paid
allocation of carbon allowances has yet been carried out. We strongly suggest to
continuously increase the proportion of carbon allowances auctions. On the one hand,
experience shows that paid distribution helps to form a higher carbon price, reduce the
total amount and intensity of emissions more effectively, and can also effectively
respond to external policy changes, such as the possible impact of the EU CBAM on
China‟s exports. On the other hand, the proceeds obtained from the auction of quotas
can be used to set up a transformation fund. The EU ETS keeps increasing the portion
of auctioning in allowance allocation, rising from 5% in phase 1 (2005-2007) to 57%
of the total amount of allowances in phase 3 (2013-2020) (European Commission,
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auctions. In addition, the EU is about to impose carbon tariffs on products from other
countries that have not adopted the same level of carbon emission reduction as the EU.
Carbon tariffs will be levied once the products land in the EU, and will have different
repercussions. Developing countries are firmly opposed to the EU‟s implementation
of carbon tariffs, but if all revenues collected from carbon tariffs are returned to
developing countries, especially low-income developing countries for manufacturing
decarbonization, economic transformation and upgrading, and climate mitigation and
adaptation, then there may be less resistance to it.
The development stage and level of each region in China are different. For the benefit
of the country as a whole, all regions, regardless of the level of development, must
commit to a certain amount of emissions reductions. Developed regions have a high
level of economic development and are more capable of doing this. A certain amount
of funds are obtained by auctioning quotas, and the central government will
coordinate them to support the transformation and upgrading of regions with low
levels of development. It not only reflects fairness, but also is conducive to meeting
the goals of the national unified energy and environmental constraints.
6.3 Issuing more carbon allowances to individuals of low-income groups
Low-income groups generally do not have private cars. Based on the average number
of kilometers driven by a car every year and how much gasoline is consumed, we can
calculate an average carbon emissions from a private car. If you don‟t have a private
car, you may take more public transportation. We can calculate the average total
carbon emission of public transportation in each region to derive an average carbon
emissions of an individual taking public transportation. The individual difference
between the average emissions from private cars and the average emissions from
public transport without private cars can be used as the basis for allocating allowances
to low-income groups. Allocation of quotas to low-income groups may also be
decided in other ways. Here is just a suggestion for reference, mainly to bring out this
issue.
It is required that individual carbon allowances must be sold in the year of allocation
or a certain percentage of individual carbon allowances must be sold; if they are not
sold in the year of allocation, a certain percentage will be voided, or the allowance
will be voided when a car is available. Requiring to sell in the current year is partly
because there may be some changes in income next year, and there may be a private
car. But this requirement is mainly to encourage the realization of quotas, increase
income, and increase the liquidity of the carbon market. On the other hand, the
national carbon market has not yet allowed carbon allowances to accumulate over
time. Whether individual allowances are allowed to be accumulated over time, it is
best to be consistent with whether the national carbon market allowances are allowed
to be accumulated over time.
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market. The energy and environment market is an important part of the construction
of a unified large national market, and the construction of a national unified carbon
market is then an important part of building a unified national energy and ecological
environment market. Although the carbon market is a policy market, the government
can take into account different development stages of regions and treat them
differently in setting the total amount of carbon allowances and the manner and
degree of leniency in issuing allowances, thus reducing differences between regions
and helping achieve common prosperity.
However, for the construction of the carbon market, the unification of the big market
means the unification of rules, which can reflect the equivalence of carbon emissions
quotas. As has been the case, in the carbon trading pilots, the allocation of carbon
allowances in many industries is based on the benchmark method. In some pilot areas,
the benchmark standards are set relatively low, and the implementation is relatively
loose, which makes it too easy for some companies to comply with the quota
requirements. By contrast, in other pilots, the benchmarks are set too high, resulting in
that some enterprises that control energy consumption well have not been recognized
in terms of quotas for their efforts in energy conservation and emissions reduction.
They have to pay more to buy quota in the market. Therefore, from the perspective of
carbon emissions quota allocation, the core of the carbon market, the construction of
the national carbon market must first speed up the establishment of a unified national
system and rules, which not only makes the carbon price comparison of the same
industry in various regions comparable to a certain extent, but also facilitates in the
next step to promote the linkage between the national carbon market and the local
carbon market, and to trade carbon allowances in the national and regional carbon
markets so as to form larger national carbon market covering more industries and
regions.

7. Conclusions and discussions
China‟s commitment to carbon neutrality before 2060 came as a complete surprise to
both international and Chinese communities. To achieve both carbon peaking and
carbon neutrality requires huge capital investment. Government finance can only
cover a small portion of required investment, and the significant gap must be made up
by social capital, which must be guided by market-oriented approaches. The carbon
market can just play such a role in providing market carbon price signals,
incentivizing and attracting resources to tilt towards low-carbon green projects,
promote green and low-carbon development, and achieve the aforementioned dual
carbon goals while helping entities cut carbon emissions at the least cost.
Launching the national carbon market with the power generation sector is a good start
point and will help form a carbon price signal across the whole society. Since its
operation, the carbon price has not experienced sharp fluctuations, entities engaging
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although there are significant differences across provinces. Under the premise of
ensuring its smooth and standardized operation after the launching of carbon trading
across the country, it is necessary to accelerate the expansion of the participating
industries and the scope of the carbon market. Iron and steel, cement industry, and
electrolytic aluminum account for about 25% of the national carbon emissions, and
should be given priority for inclusion of the national carbon trading scheme. Further
coverage expands to industries such as petrochemical, chemicals, other building
materials, nonferrous metals, papermaking, and aviation in the next five years. As
such, about 70% of the national total carbon emissions are covered under the national
trading scheme. That will enable carbon pricing to play a crucial role in incentivizing
energy-saving and carbon abating, and ensure the dual carbon goals to be met at the
least cost.
In the meantime, given the co-existence of the nationwide carbon market and regional
carbon market pilots, the regional carbon markets can continue to take the initiative to
strengthen the synergistic effects of national carbon market, exploring earlier than the
country as a whole to take the lead in the transition to a mass-based carbon market
and exploring the construction of a regional carbon market across the institutional
jurisdiction of administrative regions through the carbon market in the
Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. In this area, it is also suggested to
explore the linkage between the national carbon market and the regional carbon
market, starting with trading in regional carbon markets that have done a good job in
MRVing carbon emissions data, and gradually expanding to other regional carbon
markets that meet emissions data requirements. Regardless of whether or not to
undertake these efforts, there exists necessity to further reform the electricity pricing
mechanism and coordinate the development of various related markets, such as power
market, green electricity market and carbon-related markets to promote coordinated
development of the carbon market and electricity market.
That said, going forward, there are a lot of rooms for improvement in design,
operation and compliance of China‟s national carbon ETS. First of all, the quota
allocation plan does not provide long-term stable policy expectations for market
players. In the case of the overall oversupply of allowances in the first compliance
cycle, power generation plants are generally reluctant to sell allowances, reflecting
their panic mentality. On the one hand, power plants cannot judge how tight the future
quota allocation scheme would be, thus resulting in very few transactions not for the
purpose of compliance. This is not conducive to carbon market price discovery and
resource allocation. On the other hand, the lack of a long-term pricing mechanism is
difficult to guide power plants‟ low-carbon investment, which has hindered the
emissions reduction process to a certain extent.
Thus, there is necessity to establish a scientific long-term mechanism for quota
allocation. The EU ETS has clearly defined the declining overall quota over time for
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mechanism, such as quota adjustment mechanism and baseline updating mechanism,
is conducive to the emissions controlling enterprises‟ clear expectations of the quota
tightening scale and quota updating time, so as to make informed decisions to ensure
the long-term stable operation of the carbon market.
Second, the block agreement transaction dominates trading in allowances in current
national carbon ETS, and should have more listing trading for increasing transparency
and efficiency. The transaction process of block agreement is not transparent enough,
and the transaction price settled is not a reflection of the value of the quota, nor does it
reflect the marginal cost of emissions reduction in the industry. Not only price signals
are distorted, but also this kind of transaction itself will increase transaction costs to a
certain extent.
Third, the less developed regions and small entities across the whole country may be
the constraint to the full compliance of national carbon ETS. In the seven pilot areas
of carbon trading, the development level of Chongqing can reflect most of China.
Even if the deadline for compliance was postponed one month later than the original
plan deadline, the compliance rate was only 70% in the first compliance cycle. The
difficulties faced by Chongqing show that it is not easy to promote carbon trading
from the pilot areas to the whole country. Similarly, Ningxia, one of the poorest
regions in China recorded the lowest compliance rate at the province level in the first
compliance cycle. Noticeable difference in the overall compliance rate against
allowances and against entities respectively reflects the difficulties faced by small
entities in meeting the compliance obligations, and will be a decisive factor in
determining whether national carbon ETS achieves the full compliance with
emissions obligations and how quickly national carbon ETS expands.
Fourth, paid allocation of carbon allowances has not yet been carried out in national
ETS, and it is strongly recommended to continuously increase the proportion of
carbon allowances auctions. Not only because paid distribution helps form a higher
carbon price, reduce the total amount and intensity of emissions more effectively, and
can also effectively respond to external policy changes, such as the possible impact of
the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism on China‟s exports. Auctioning carbon
allowances helps alleviate the reluctance of plants to sell allowances in surplus. More
importantly, the proceeds obtained from the auction of quotas can be used to set up a
transformation fund to support the transformation and upgrading of regions with low
levels of development and technology in China. It not only reflects fairness, but also is
conducive to meeting the goals of the national unified energy and environmental
constraints.
Finally and fundamentally, data quality, supervision and management are the top
priority for the stable and healthy operation of the carbon market. Why power
generation industry is considered first in the national carbon market and why its
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problems of emissions data are not only on the side of the emissions controlling
entities. They involve other institutions as well. Based on special monitoring on the
quality of carbon emissions reports undertaken at the end of 2021, the MOEE found
that the third-party carbon verification service institutions falsified and forged
detection reports, made false coal samples, and reported distorting and inaccurate
conclusions, which endangered the stable and healthy operation of the carbon market.
Some of these problems are related to the emissions accounting guidelines concerned
are not clear enough, and some are related to the policy of high limit value of carbon
content of coal combustion element in power generation. The MOEE has made
detailed adjustment in emissions accounting guidelines, making the carbon emissions
accounting boundary and emissions sources of power generation enterprises more
clear, and fossil fuel emission calculation formula more scientific and reasonable;
refining the standard of coal element detection methods; and specifying update of test
report requirements and retention mechanism and update of requirements for periodic
reports and annual greenhouse gas emission reports, etc. The MOEE has also updated
grid emissions factors, and has made downward adjustment of controversial high limit
value of carbon content of coal combustion element in power generation. All these
efforts and adjustments are good steps forward to address the problems of imperfect
MRV system and poor emissions report data exposed in the national carbon market.
Going forward, the governments at central and provincial levels should learn from the
going practice and, wherever necessary, the MOEE should adjust emissions
accounting guidelines to strive to improve the quality of emissions data to ensure that
the carbon emissions accounting results are more accurate. The equal emphasis is
given to supervision and management of the third-party carbon verification service
institutions. Taken together, these efforts ensure that all the emissions data are
properly measured, reported and verified and real and accurate, and each unit of
emissions reductions are reliable and comparable among sectors and across regions.
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